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Abstract: 
 
We explore the relationship between gambling and other forms of risk-taking behaviour, i.e. 
exposure to debt and the use of credit, at the individual and household level using 
representative pooled cross-section data drawn from the UK Expenditure and Food Surveys 
(EFS), 2001 to 2007. Gambling and the use of credit are shown to be positively correlated at 
the household level. While both the incidence and amount of gambling vary according to 
household income, the positive association between gambling and the use of credit is 
remarkably stable across household income. In addition to our household level analysis, we 
also explore the prevalence of intra-household gambling, which has attracted relatively 
limited attention in the existing literature. It is apparent that there is strong intra-household 
correlation in both gambling activity and in the use of credit, with somewhat stronger 
relationships in lower income households. 
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GAMBLING AND THE USE OF CREDIT: A HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
According to the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (Wardle et al., 2007) 
gambling activity in the UK is widespread, with almost 70% of the population claiming 
to have taken part in some form of gambling in the previous 12 months. Although the 
National Lottery was found to be the most popular form of gambling activity, almost 
half of the population had engaged in at least one other form of gambling. Gambling 
expenditure in Britain has also been increasing rapidly in recent years; turnover in the 
gambling industry was £84 billion in 2006/07 compared to just £53 billion in 2003/04, 
(Gambling Commission, 2008), during a period in which progressive liberalisation, 
deregulation and innovation in the industry have stimulated new forms of gambling 
(e.g. spread-betting and online gambling) and raised its availability and accessibility.1  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been relatively little systematic, detailed research 
on the determinants of gambling and its association with other forms of risk-taking 
behaviour by individuals or households. This paper aims to contribute to our 
understanding of these important issues. In particular, we explore the relationship 
between gambling and the use of credit at the household level in order to place 
gambling activity within the wider context of household finances and financial risk-
taking (see also Wärneryd, 1996; Tokunaga, 1993; Ida and Goto, 2009; and Fellner 
and Maciejovsky, 2007). Given the rapid expansion in the use of credit over the past 
                                                
1
 The 2005 Gambling Act came into effect on 1 September 2007, replacing the 
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, the Gaming Act 1968 and the Lotteries and 
Amusements Act 1976. While the new act tightened some regulations relating to 
gambling activity it also brought about a significant relaxation in some other areas of 
regulation (e.g. by allowing TV and radio advertising of gambling along with 
permitting more regional casinos and bigger slot machine payouts).  
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decade and the potential financial vulnerability that debt can engender, we examine 
this relationship across different levels of household income. In addition, to further 
our understanding of gambling and debt at the household level, we also explore the 
prevalence of intra-household gambling in order to investigate the extent to which 
gambling activity is correlated across household members. 
 
The gambling literature is diverse, with contributions from a variety of social science 
disciplines, including psychology, sociology and economics. In the existing literature, 
a number of studies have identified specific socio-economic groups as being at 
increased risk from gambling, including the less-educated and those with low income 
(e.g. Shepherd et al., 1998), some ethnic minorities (e.g. Welte et al., 2001) and 
youths (e.g. Stinchfield and Winters, 1998). The statistical summaries by Sproston et 
al. (2000) and Wardle et al. (2007) of the two British Gambling Prevalence Surveys 
also report activity varying noticeably by education, income, ethnicity and age, but 
also by gender, economic activity and social group. Moreover, Clotfelter and Cook 
(1989) find that gambling acts as a regressive tax on the poor, adding to pre-existing 
socio-economic inequalities. There is some UK-based evidence to suggest that the 
proportion of income spent on gambling is inversely related to income (e.g. Shepherd 
et al., 1998). Indeed, Grun and McKeigue (2000), in a ‘pre’ and ‘post’ study of the 
introduction of the UK National Lottery, found those with a weekly income below 
£200 to have had the greatest increase in gambling expenditure as a proportion of 
income over the period of their study. 
 
Within the wider context of household finances, there has been a significant increase 
in consumer debt in the UK over the last decade or so, as well as a rapid increase in 
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gambling expenditure. According to May et al. (2004), total lending to the UK 
household sector has recently been growing faster than household income, and the 
latest (January 2010) Bank of England statistics reveal that total UK personal debt at 
the end of November 2009 stood at £1.46 trillion.2 Despite Government concern over 
debt accumulation, there is a relative scarcity of research into the determinants of 
debt at the household level.3 However, some existing studies have identified an 
association between financial insecurity and gambling. For example, Lesieur (1998) 
who explores the nature and social costs of pathological gambling in the US 
examines the costs of gambling in terms of indebtedness for the gambler. According 
to Fisher (1996), in a study of British casino gambling, over half of problem gamblers 
had been forced, through gambling, to turn to others for financial support, whereas 
approaching a half had been forced to sell possessions to service gambling debts. 
There has been some interest in establishing the costs and benefits of gambling, 
where indebtedness has been highlighted as a potential financial cost. For example, 
a NORC (1999) report4 indicated a rate of bankruptcy amongst pathological gamblers 
in the US to be approximately four times higher than for ‘low risk’ gamblers (5%) and 
non-gamblers (4%). This is consistent with the findings of the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission (1999) which reported bankruptcy rates in the US 
amongst Gamblers Anonymous members to be around 20%. Furthermore, according 
to the GamCare Services Report (2003), the average unsecured debt of gamblers 
receiving treatment from GamCare in the UK was just under £30,000 in 2003. 
                                                
2
 This is now at a level in excess of UK annual GDP and, while the majority (85%) of 
UK personal debt is secured on property, just how secure this is given the volatility in 
the housing market in the UK in recent years is an open question. 
3
 Recent contributions in this area have been made by Brown et al. (2008) and Brown 
and Taylor (2008) focusing on financial expectations and financial pressure at the 
household level. 
4
 National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) at the University of Chicago. 
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Nevertheless, there has been relatively little systematic detailed research on the 
determinants of gambling and its association with other forms of risk-taking behaviour 
by individuals or households including exposure to debt and the use of credit.  
 
Rather than focussing on pathological or problem gamblers, we are interested in 
gambling and financial indebtedness across the whole population as a broad 
indicator of (financial) risk-taking by households. In particular, given the differences in 
potential financial vulnerability as a consequence of high indebtedness amongst 
poorer households compared to richer households, we are concerned with how 
(financial) risk-taking behaviour varies with household income. Haisley et al. (2008), 
who adopt an experimental approach with low-income participants to analyse the 
decision to purchase state lottery tickets, highlight the “peanuts effect”, i.e. the 
possibility that individuals may not fully recognise the long-term cumulative costs of 
gambling with individuals discounting the cost of, for example, one lottery ticket as a 
“peanut” without realising the extent to which such costs may accumulate over time. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the following section we 
describe our data and methodology. Section 3 reports the findings on both the 
incidence and amount of gambling activity by households and individuals in our 
sample, and the association between gambling and the use of credit. Section 4 
explores how this association varies across household income bands. Finally, section 
5 presents our discussion and conclusions. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
Our data are drawn from the UK Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), 2001-2007, 
which is compiled by the ONS and DEFRA. This is an annual cross-section survey of 
around 6,000 households per year comprising around 15,000 individuals (adults and 
children). The EFS resulted from a merger of the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
and the National Food Survey (NFS) in 2001/2.5 Originally constructed on a financial 
year basis, it moved to a calendar year basis from January 2006 to be consistent with 
other major ONS surveys. The EFS is used to provide information for the 
construction of the UK retail price index (RPI) as well as in estimating consumption 
expenditures for the National Accounts.6 
 
We pool data from seven EFS surveys (2001/2, 2002/3, 2003/4, 2004/5, 2005/6, 
2006, and 2007), taking care not to include the repeated observations in the first 
quarter of 2006 when the survey switched from financial to calendar years. There are 
three main elements to the EFS data collection. First, there is the household 
questionnaire which gathers key information and characteristics about the household, 
and is usually completed by the household reference person (i.e. the head of 
household). Second, there is an income questionnaire which records the key person-
level information. Finally, there is the expenditure and food diary which each 
individual respondent completes every day for a two week period, and which records 
                                                
5
 There were a number of significant changes when the FES and NFS were merged 
into the EFS, and so we do not attempt to utilise data prior to 2001. 
6
 Note that while the EFS is ostensibly a household survey, we also have access to 
the individual expenditure diaries so can make use of the survey data at the 
individual level as well as at the more aggregated household level. 
 8 
every single item of expenditure made by each separate individual member of the 
household. 
 
We utilise data from all three elements of the EFS in the analysis undertaken below. 
Individuals’ gambling expenditures are derived from their individual diary data, and 
are then merged with their individual and household characteristics drawn from the 
income and household questionnaires, respectively.7 Finally, data on individuals’ 
loans and other forms of credit are merged with their gambling expenditures and 
other characteristics. Where these are not already derived variables provided within 
the EFS data, household level variables are constructed by aggregating across all 
household members. The accounting period for all EFS derived variables is on a 
(averaged) weekly basis, and so the information taken from the two-week diary data 
is also averaged correspondingly. The EFS is a stratified random sample with 
clustering, and weights are required in order to ensure that the resulting statistics are 
representative of the UK population. These weights are employed as appropriate in 
the analysis undertaken below. All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices using 
the monthly RPI index (CHAW, rebased to average 2005 = 100) corresponding to the 
respondent’s month of interview. 
 
Total gambling expenditure is the sum of the stakes placed on a variety of gambling 
activities, including: football ‘pools’, bingo, book-makers, lottery (including National 
Lottery, Irish and other lotteries) and scratch cards. While we note the potential 
                                                
7
 Of course, we recognise that there may be underreporting of gambling activity in the 
EFS in the same way as alcohol and tobacco consumption are known to be 
underreported in household surveys of this kind. However, the large number of other 
control variables we include in our analysis should hopefully remove the influence of 
any systematic underreporting between different groups within the population. 
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difficulties in collecting data on gambling ‘expenditure’ in terms of the ambiguity 
between gross expenditure (stakes) and net expenditure (stakes less winnings) as 
highlighted by Blaszczynski et al. (1997), we are confident here that respondents are 
reporting gross expenditures since the information we have is drawn from an explicit 
expenditure survey (and, moreover, information on income, including gambling 
winnings is collated separately in the EFS). Gross gambling expenditure is the 
relevant measure of interest here since we are interested in gambling as a reflection 
of risk-taking behaviour. 
 
Our key credit variables are loans, hire purchase agreements and credit club 
payments. For loans and hire-purchase agreements, we have information on both the 
original purchase price at acquisition as well as the weekly payment. For credit club 
payments, the weekly equivalent value of the goods purchased is included. A number 
of other independent variables at the household and individual level are also 
employed in the analysis presented below. Variable descriptions and summary 
statistics are provided in Table 1. Panel 1 presents information for all households; 
Panel 2 for heads of households, and Panel 3 for all adults in these households. 
Around 54% of all households had engaged in some form of gambling activity in the 
2 week diary period, and measured across all households, average (real 2005 prices) 
stakes were £3.59 per household per week (or equivalently, an average of £6.59 
amongst those households where some gambling activity did take place). Across 
individuals, almost 40% of individuals engaged in some form of gambling8, with an 
average across all adults of £1.96 per week (or equivalently, an average of £5.06 for 
those adults who engaged in some form of gambling activity). 
                                                
8
 This compares quite closely to Wardle et al. (2007, p.31) who report that 41% of 
adults said they participated in gambling in the last week. 
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2.2 Methodology 
In the empirical analysis below, estimation is undertaken separately at three different 
levels of aggregation: (1) at the household level; (2) for heads of households, and (3) 
at the individual level for all adults while allowing for intra-household correlation. We 
pool the data across the seven EFS surveys, but the unit of observation differs 
across the three specifications. 
 
Initially, we investigate which characteristics at the household and head of household 
level are associated with the probability of gambling. Defining *htG as a continuous 
latent variable (‘gambling propensity’) and its observed empirical counterpart as htG , 
then: 

 >+β+=
=
0u'
otherwise0
RyGif1G htht1ht1
*
ht
ht
X
 (1a) 
determines if the unit of observation h (household or head of household), pooled over 
time t , places a stake on any type of gambling activity. With normality assumptions 
on the error term, htu , equation (1a) is estimated via a probit specification. htR  is a 
binary indicator for whether any credit repayments were made, where the key 
parameter of interest is 1y , which serves to inform us about the relationship between 
the probability of gambling and the use of credit. Additional covariates are specified 
in the vector htX  and are defined below.  
 
For the specifications based upon adult individuals we define *ihtG  as a continuous 
latent variable (‘gambling propensity’) and its observed empirical counterpart as ihtG , 
then: 
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
 >ε+β+=
=
0'
otherwise0
RyGif1G ihtiht2iht2
*
iht
iht
X
 (1b) 
determines if the unit of observation, adult individuals i  within a household h  )hi( ∈ , 
pooled over time t , places a stake on any type of gambling activity. In equation (1b) 
the error term is decomposed (ignoring time subscripts) as ihhih η+α=ε  where hα  
represents the household-specific unobservable effect and ihη  is a random error 
term, ),0(N~ 2ihih ηση . Hence, the correlation between the error terms of individuals 
within households is a constant given by: )/(),(corr 2ih2h2hkhlh1 ηαα σ+σσ=εε=ρ , )kl( ≠  
where 1ρ  represents the proportion of the total unexplained variance in the 
dependent variable contributed by the household variance component. Thus, the 
magnitude of 1ρ  yields information pertaining to the incidence of intra-household 
gambling. 
 
Having examined whether an association exists between credit payments and the 
probability of gambling at the three levels of aggregation, specifications are also 
estimated to investigate whether the covariates also influence the amount of the 
stake placed. Given that the level of the gambling stake, S , cannot be negative, it is 
treated as a censored variable in our econometric analysis. Since the distribution of 
the weekly stake is highly skewed, we specify a logarithmic dependent variable 
following Gropp et al. (1997). For units of observation (i.e. households, head of 
households, or individuals) reporting zero gambling stakes, )Sln(  is recoded to zero, 
as there are no reported stakes between zero and unity. We employ a tobit 
specification to identify the determinants of )Sln(  which allows for the censored 
dependent variable.  
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We estimate the following pooled tobit model at the household and head of 
household level, h , for gambling expenditure: 
htht1ht1
*
ht w'π)Cln()Sln( ++θ= X , (2a) 
0Sif)Sln()Sln( *ht*htht >= , (2b) 
otherwise0)Sln( ht = , (2c) 
where htS  is the stake placed by the household or head of household h  at time t , 
htC  is the total credit repayments of the household, and htw  denotes a stochastic 
disturbance term, ),0(N~w 2whtht σ . The key parameter of interest is 1θ  which serves 
to inform us about the relationship between the level of gambling stakes placed and 
the amount of credit repayments. When estimating over all adult individuals: 
ihtiht2iht2
*
iht v'π)Cln()Sln( ++θ= X , (3a) 
0Sif)Sln()Sln( *iht*ihtiht >= , (3b) 
otherwise0)Sln( iht = , (3c) 
where ihtS  is the stake placed by individual i  in household h  at time t , ihtC  is the 
total credit repayments of the individual, the error term is once again decomposed 
(ignoring time subscripts) in the same manner as previously, ihhihv ψ+ϕ= , such that 
)/()v,v(corr 2 ih2h2hkhlh2 ψϕϕ σ+σσ==ρ , )kl( ≠  where 2ρ , represents the proportion of the 
total unexplained variance in the dependent variable contributed by the household 
variance component. Thus, the magnitude of 2ρ  yields information pertaining to the 
levels of intra-household gambling. 
 
In our set of covariates, X , in the probit and tobit specifications, controls are included 
for a number of influences which may affect either the probability of engaging in 
gambling activity or the level of gambling expenditure. For the models which focus 
upon household level or head of household analysis, covariates in X  are specified 
for the head of household where appropriate (e.g. gender), whilst, for the individual 
level analysis, covariates in X  are defined at the individual level, with the exception 
of the household level characteristics (see Table 1 for full details). To be specific, we 
control for the following characteristics: gender; a quadratic in age; ethnicity (only 
available for the head of household); age left full time education (FTE); being a lone 
parent; and marital status, i.e. whether cohabiting, single, widowed, separated or 
divorced. Controls for labour force status are also included: whether full-time 
employed; part-time employed; unemployed or not in the labour market. Household 
characteristics include: housing tenure, i.e. whether the accommodation is rented 
privately, owned on a mortgage or owned outright, and log (real) weekly household 
income. We also condition upon year and regional dummy variables. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 The probability of gambling and the use of credit 
We first present the results where equations (1a) and (1b) are estimated via a probit 
specification to investigate whether there is any association between those 
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households who have to make any regular credit repayments and the probability of 
gambling. The results are shown in Specification A of Table 2 where the analysis is 
conducted at the household level (Panel 1), head of household level (Panel 2) and 
individual level (Panel 3). Marginal effects on the probability of gambling are reported 
in each case. It is apparent that, across all three levels of aggregation, the influence 
of whether a household or individual makes any weekly credit repayment on the 
probability of gambling is positive and statistically significant, and also very similar for 
all three levels of aggregation. Thus, for example, focussing on households (Panel 
1), making current credit repayments is associated with a 5 percentage point higher 
probability of gambling. This effect is large as compared to the mean probability of 
gambling shown in Table 1. 
 
Other findings common across the different levels of aggregation and which are 
consistent with the existing empirical evidence (see, for example, Sproston et al., 
2000; Wardle et al., 2007), are that males and lone parents are more likely to 
gamble. The probability of gambling is also increasing in age, albeit at a decreasing 
rate and reaching a peak at around age 55. Factors that lower the probability of 
gambling are the number of years of education, being non-white, all labour market 
states relative to being in paid employment, a higher number of children in the 
household, and housing tenure relative to living in accommodation owned by a local 
authority (LA) or housing association (HA). The association of gambling with 
household income is insignificantly different from zero at the mean household 
income, ceteris paribus, for both households (Panel 1), and for head of households 
(Panel 2). However, at the individual level (as reported in Panel 3), the relationship 
between gambling and income is more complex – higher household income is 
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associated with significantly lower individual gambling propensity, although this effect 
is offset to a degree by higher individual income. We explore this in greater detail in 
Section 4 below. 
 
The final column in Table 2 which presents the individual level analysis, allows for 
intra-household correlation in gambling propensity. This appears to be important 
since the estimated correlation coefficient 2441.01 =ρ  is positive and statistically 
significant. Hence around one quarter of the unexplained variation in individuals’ 
gambling propensity can be accounted for by the (unobserved) predilection of others 
in the household to engage in gambling. 
 
In order to explore whether gambling is associated with particular types of credit, the 
dummy variable indicating whether any credit repayments are currently being made 
is decomposed into three types: loans; hire purchase (HP) agreements; and credit 
clubs. Individuals and households may have more than one type of credit. Making 
payments on loans is by far the most common form of credit repayment as shown in 
the summary statistics in Table 1. The results obtained for the different types of credit 
are reported in Specification B of Table 2 (the other covariates in Specification A are 
also included in these regressions but are not reported since their marginal effects 
are little changed). It is apparent that the existence of credit club repayments is most 
strongly associated with the probability of gambling, with an 8.4 percentage point 
increase in the probability of gambling at the household level and a 9.5 percentage 
point increase in the probability of gambling for individuals when this form of credit is 
utilised. However, relatively few households or individuals access this form of credit 
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as shown in Table 1. In contrast, households and individuals with HP agreements are 
no more or less likely to gamble than those without this form of credit.9 
3.2 The level of gambling expenditure and the amount of credit repayments 
Specification A of Table 3 presents the results from the tobit analysis, where we 
investigate the relationship between the amount of current credit repayments and the 
amount of the gambling stakes. To evaluate the impact of a covariate on the level of 
gambling expenditure, we derive the marginal effects for the censored variable from 
the estimated coefficients. These are calculated by multiplying the estimated 
coefficient, θ , by the scaling factor (ignoring subscripts): )/}'π)Cln(({ σ+θφ X , where 
φ  denotes the cumulative distribution of the standard normal and σ  is the standard 
error of the regression equation. 
 
Since monetary values are in log units, estimating the association between gambling 
stakes and the amount of credit repayment is effectively evaluating an elasticity. To 
be specific, a one per cent increase in credit repayments is associated with around 
0.03 per cent higher total household gambling expenditure and also a 0.03 per cent 
higher gambling expenditure by adult individuals. As with the probability of any 
gambling, the elasticity of gambling stakes with respect to credit repayment is almost 
the same for all three levels of disaggregation. In general, the factors that were seen 
to determine the incidence of any gambling as reported in Table 2 are also seen to 
impact upon the amount of gambling as presented in Table 3. Thus males who are 
                                                
9
 There is also some information available in the EFS on credit card interest payments, and this is 
clearly an important source of credit for some households and individuals. Unfortunately, this data is 
reliably available only at the household level but not at the individual level, and hence we cannot 
include it in all three levels of aggregation examined here. However, for the household level equation, 
the results obtained when this additional source of credit is included show that household credit card 
interest payments have a similar impact on the probability of gambling as loan repayments, and the 
other coefficients are robust to its inclusion. Hence its omission would not appear to affect the 
substantive findings. 
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older, white, less educated, in work and living in public housing are more likely to 
gamble, and to gamble more. Interestingly, the elasticity of gambling stakes is 
equally as large in terms of magnitude as the income elasticity at the individual level. 
Once again, the individual level analysis in Panel 3 allows for intra-household 
correlation in gambling stakes. The correlation coefficient 2042.02 =ρ  is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that gambling expenditures are positively 
correlated across individuals within households. 
 
Specification B of Table 3 reports the results when credit repayments are 
distinguished by type: loan repayments, HP repayments and credit club repayments. 
Loan repayments dominate total credit payments as shown in Table 1. The estimated 
elasticities of gambling stakes with respect to loans and, especially, credit club 
payments are rather larger than for HP agreements. For example, for credit club 
payments, the elasticity is about 0.05 for all three levels of aggregation (households, 
heads of households and individuals), whereas for HP agreements, the elasticity is 
only 0.01 for individuals and is insignificantly different from zero for households and 
for heads of households.10 
 
4. Variation in gambling and the use of credit by household income 
A key question of interest is how the relationship between gambling and the use of 
credit as indicators of financial risk-taking varies across household income. In 
particular, do poorer households who may be more vulnerable to income uncertainty 
                                                
10
 As explained above, we can also include the amount of credit card interest 
payments in the household level equation as an additional credit repayment 
commitment. The results of this exercise reveal that, as with the probability of 
gambling, credit card interest repayments have a similar relationship to the level of 
gambling stakes as loan repayments, while the other coefficients are little affected by 
its omission/inclusion. 
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and volatility reveal rather different financial risk-taking behaviours? Tables 4 and 5 
repeat the analysis in Tables 2 and 3 respectively, separately for households in the 
bottom quartile and top quartile of household income. For ease of comparison, the 
results for all households as obtained previously are also presented in the tables. 
Only the variables of immediate interest are reported, but in each case, the other 
covariates as in Table 2 and Table 3 are also included in each regression. 
 
Table 4 reports the probit results for the incidence of any gambling and its 
association with any credit repayments. The first column repeats the results from 
Table 2 for all households, while the second and third columns report the results for 
the low income and high income households respectively. Results are reported for 
the three levels of aggregation as before in the three Panels of the table. The first 
point to note is that the relationship between gambling and income is non-linear. The 
overall effect measured across all households in Column 1 is estimated to be 
insignificantly different from zero, but this serves to obscure an important non-linear 
relationship. For low income households, there is a small but positive relationship 
between household income and the probability of gambling, but for high income 
households, there is a large and negative impact of increasing income on the 
probability of gambling. However, the positive association between gambling and the 
use of credit is approximately the same at all levels of household income, with the 
use of credit associated with a 4-5% higher probability of gambling. 
 
Similar patterns are observed for heads of households as presented in Panel 2 and 
for individuals as in Panel 3, although for low income households, the positive 
relationship observed between household income and gambling propensity is smaller 
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and not statistically significant. Individual income in high income households partly 
offsets the negative relationship between higher household income and the 
probability of gambling activity. The intra-household correlation (i.e. co-determination) 
in gambling is stronger for low income households than for high income households. 
Of most interest to this study, however, is that the positive relationship between 
gambling and the use of credit is around 4-5% for all levels of aggregation and 
across all household income levels. This constancy in the estimated relationship 
suggests attitudes to financial risk-taking – at least with regard to the use of credit 
and gambling – are rather similar across household types. 
 
Table 5 reports the tobit results by household income. Similar patterns are observed 
as in Table 4 above. The relationship between household income and gambling 
stakes is non-linear, and is positive for low income households (so gambling is a 
normal good) but negative for high income households (so gambling is an inferior 
good). But the elasticity of gambling stakes with respect to credit repayments is 
significantly positive and equal to 0.03 irrespective of household income. For heads 
of households (Panel 2), and all individuals (Panel 3), similar findings are apparent, 
with gambling highly inferior in high income households. Once again, there is a 
stronger co-determination of the amount that individuals gamble in low income 
households as compared to high income households. However, the relationship 
between gambling expenditure and credit repayment is invariant to household 
income.11 
                                                
11
 We also investigated defining high and low income households by quartiles of 
equivalised household income rather than simply household income, in order to 
account for the income of households relative to their size. None of the results 
presented above are qualitatively affected by this alternative definition of 'poor' and 
'rich' households. However, the differences in the intrahousehold correlations 
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The number of observations and the degree of censoring shown at the bottom of 
each Panel in Table 5 indicates that high income households are larger, on average. 
Moreover, a greater proportion of both heads of household and individuals in high 
income households do not gamble, consistent with the strong negative income 
elasticity producing a lower level of gambling in high income households.12 However, 
the attitudes to financial risk-taking overall seems little different by household income 
bands. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Given the recent policy changes relating to gambling in the UK along with innovations 
in the gambling industry and the underlying trends towards increased gambling 
activity, it is surprising that as yet there has been relatively little detailed research 
regarding gambling and its determinants in the UK. Given the existence of ‘problem’ 
gambling as well as financial pressures at the household level, it is not surprising that 
the recent changes in gambling legislation and gambling accessibility have attracted 
public debate. In order to understand the potential impact of these changes at the 
individual and household level, as well as on society more generally, we need to be 
better informed regarding which individuals engage in gambling, the intensity with 
which they gamble and, in particular, the degree to which gambling is associated with 
financial vulnerability. Our empirical findings suggest a positive association between 
                                                                                                                                                   
between low and high income households are even larger when using equivalised 
income to define relative household income, since the intrahousehold correlations 
are larger in poor households and smaller in rich households than those presented in 
Panel 3 in Tables 4 and 5. 
12
 Wardle et al. (2007) report declining individual gambling propensity for the top 
quintile of household income as compared to the 4th quintile, although the probability 
of gambling is still greater than for the bottom quintile. 
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the propensity to engage in gambling activity and the use of credit at both the 
individual and the household level. In addition, we reveal a positive relationship 
between the amount spent on gambling and the level of credit repayments. 
Furthermore, we find evidence supporting a positive correlation between gambling 
activity across household members thereby highlighting the possibility that financial 
vulnerability may be concentrated within particular types of household. 
 
Focussing separately on poorer and richer households, we show that the relationship 
between gambling and household income is non-linear. However, the propensity of 
households and individuals to engage in gambling and their willingness to expose 
themselves to financial vulnerability through the use of credit appears to be little 
influenced or affected by household income. While richer households may be able to 
better protect themselves against financial uncertainty, those in poorer households 
are less able to do so. Given the current unease amongst policy makers regarding 
the levels of secured and unsecured debt at the household level, the similar attitude 
to financial risk-taking in terms of their propensity to gamble for given levels of 
indebtedness may be a cause for concern. It would certainly merit further 
investigation beyond the reduced form associations presented in this paper. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Variable description 
HOUSEHOLD 
LEVEL 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Whether any gambling expenditure 0.54 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Gambling stakes (£) 3.59 14.78 2.22 13.63 1.96 10.71 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
Whether any credit repayments 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.42 
Whether any loan repayments 0.29 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 
Whether any HP repayments 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 
Whether any credit club repayments 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 
Total payments (£) 18.45 43.62 13.10 37.62 10.24 31.48 
Loan payments (£) 14.49 33.35 10.50 27.74 8.04 23.99 
HP payments (£) 2.45 24.24 1.74 22.95 1.36 17.75 
Credit club payments (£) 1.51 11.98 0.86 9.89 0.83 8.90 
Male 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.47 0.50 
Age 51.37 16.66 51.37 16.66 47.83 17.43 
Age2/1000 2.92 1.78 2.92 1.78 2.59 1.75 
Age left FTE 16.98 3.77 16.98 3.77 16.96 4.14 
Lone-parent 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.19 
White (base: omitted category) 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.24 
Non-white 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 
Log(individual income) (£) – – 10.04 1.67 9.51 2.24 
Log(household income) (£) 10.52 1.18 10.52 1.18 10.69 1.12 
Employee (base: omitted category) 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Self-employed 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 
Unemployed 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 
Sick 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 
Retired 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 
Unoccupied 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 
Disability 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 
Number of adults in household 1.80 0.73 1.80 0.73 2.10 0.85 
Number of children household 0.59 1.00 0.59 1.00 0.64 1.02 
Number of workers in household 1.09 1.00 1.09 1.00 1.33 1.10 
Workless household 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.45 
Married (base: omitted category) 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Cohabiting 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
Single 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 
Widowed 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.26 
Separated/divorced 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27 
LA/HA (base: omitted category) 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 
Privately rented  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 
Owned on a mortgage 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Owned outright 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 
Observations 45,349 45,349 80,573 
Note: Expenditure and income variables are expressed in real 2005 prices. 
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Table 2: Probit analysis of the probability of gambling 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
 
HOUSEHOLD 
LEVEL 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
Specification A 
TOTAL CREDIT M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0510 9.21 0.0441 7.93 0.0521 10.65 
Male$ 0.0148 2.48 0.0238 4.11 0.0211 5.30 
Age 0.0240 20.86 0.0216 18.98 0.0251 28.20 
Age squared/1000 –0.2133 18.55 –0.1934 17.07 -0.2258 24.39 
Age left full time education –0.0270 29.65 –0.0251 27.34 -0.0197 27.76 
Lone parent$ 0.0574 4.82 0.0532 4.45 0.0513 4.16 
Non-white$ –0.1652 14.03 –0.1030 8.98 -0.1487 15.08 
Log individual current income – – 0.0002 0.10 0.0065 5.45 
Log household current income –0.0012 0.48 –0.0031 0.90 -0.0168 6.60 
Self-employed$ –0.0891 9.49 –0.0779 8.66 -0.0835 10.48 
Unemployed$ –0.0282 1.35 –0.0100 0.49 -0.0253 1.79 
Sick$ –0.0470 2.82 –0.0562 3.58 -0.0649 5.71 
Retired$ 0.0224 1.48 0.0117 0.80 0.0057 0.53 
Unoccupied$ –0.0419 2.65 –0.0417 2.71 -0.0626 6.84 
Disability$ 0.0117 0.98 –0.0069 0.60 0.0000 0.00 
Number adults in household 0.0532 8.79 –0.0031 0.53 -0.0012 0.28 
Number children in household –0.0135 4.41 –0.0176 5.84 -0.0144 5.58 
Number workers in household 0.0348 6.05 0.0103 1.87 0.0188 4.10 
Workless household$ –0.0174 1.34 –0.0177 1.42 -0.0093 1.00 
Cohabiting$ 0.0067 0.70 0.0240 2.57 0.0274 3.50 
Single$ –0.1086 10.96 –0.0045 0.46 -0.0055 0.74 
Widowed$ –0.0924 8.41 0.0214 2.00 0.0282 2.93 
Separated/divorced$ –0.1067 10.78 0.0089 0.93 0.0029 0.34 
Privately rent$ –0.0635 5.99 –0.0713 7.01 -0.0991 10.81 
Owned on a mortgage$ –0.0215 2.62 –0.0243 3.08 -0.0539 7.66 
Owned outright$ –0.0660 8.20 –0.0615 8.01 -0.0812 11.62 
ρ1 – – – – 0.2441 29.73 
χ2(43:44:44) [p value] 5236.1 [p=0.00] 2886.2 [p=0.00] 4174.1 [p=0.00] 
 
Specification B: 
TYPES OF CREDIT M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Whether any loan repayments$ 0.0430 7.41 0.0398 6.72 0.0417 7.76 
Whether any HP repayments$ 0.0014 0.16 0.0089 0.91 0.0166 1.84 
Whether any credit club rep’s$ 0.0846 7.69 0.0821 5.76 0.0949 8.23 
ρ1 – – – – 0.2435 29.64 
χ2(45:46:46) [p value] 5271.6 [p=0.00] 2905.1 [p=0.00] 4194.6 [p=0.00] 
Observations 45,349 45,349 80,573 
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Notes to Table 2: 
1. Coefficients reported are marginal effects (M.E.) on the probability that the household (Panel 
1), head of household (Panel 2) or adult individuals within the household (Panel 3) engages 
in any form of gambling activity. For dummy variables, denoted $, the coefficient reported is 
for the discrete change of the dummy from 0 to 1. The ‘z-ratio’ reports the test that the 
underlying coefficient is equal to zero. 
2. In the household level equation (Panel 1), the individual characteristics are those of the head 
of household. Reference categories are: female; head of household white; employee; no 
disability; at least one adult in work; married; local authority or housing association. 
3. In Panel 3, ρ1 is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by the intra-household 
variation in gambling propensity. 
4. The χ2 test is a test for the joint significance of the explanatory variables. 
5. The regression in Specification B which differentiates between different types of credit also 
includes all of the other independent variables reported in Specification A. Their coefficient 
estimates are little different from those in Specification A and so are not reported here but are 
available on request. 
6. All regressions also include 6 calendar year dummy variables and 12 regional dummy 
variables. 
 26 
Table 3: Tobit analysis of gambling stakes 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
 
HOUSEHOLD 
LEVEL 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
Specification A: 
TOTAL CREDIT M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Log total credit repayments 0.0297 10.09 0.0257 8.42 0.0262 11.12 
Male$ 0.0883 3.38 0.1486 5.72 0.1208 7.66 
Age 0.1177 22.67 0.1037 19.99 0.1070 30.24 
Age squared/1000 –1.0422 20.14 –0.9232 17.93 –0.9585 26.03 
Age left full time education –0.1407 33.31 –0.1253 29.13 –0.0860 29.45 
Lone parent$ 0.2175 3.88 0.2419 4.39 0.2047 4.14 
Non-white$ –0.7725 15.64 –0.5055 9.83 –0.6579 16.53 
Log individual current income – – –0.0017 0.18 0.0266 5.63 
Log household current income 0.0024 0.21 –0.0071 0.45 –0.0664 6.53 
Self-employed$ –0.3649 9.25 –0.3340 8.32 –0.3274 10.32 
Unemployed$ –0.1239 1.37 –0.0482 0.53 –0.1237 2.21 
Sick$ –0.2023 2.91 –0.2502 3.63 –0.2625 5.93 
Retired$ 0.1257 1.93 0.0617 0.94 0.0248 0.59 
Unoccupied$ –0.1933 2.86 –0.1814 2.64 –0.2567 7.06 
Disability$ 0.0764 1.45 –0.0070 0.14 0.0214 0.55 
Number adults in household 0.2629 10.23 –0.0125 0.47 –0.0080 0.45 
Number children in household –0.0578 4.31 –0.0796 5.84 –0.0575 5.55 
Number workers in household 0.1030 4.25 0.0406 1.66 0.0733 4.01 
Workless household$ –0.1789 3.26 –0.1053 1.89 –0.0494 1.35 
Cohabiting$ 0.0870 2.09 0.1349 3.17 0.1286 4.09 
Single$ –0.5073 12.16 –0.0108 0.25 –0.0176 0.58 
Widowed$ –0.4296 9.35 0.1042 2.16 0.1084 2.85 
Separated/divorced$ –0.4889 11.88 0.0390 0.90 –0.0024 0.07 
Privately rent$ –0.3305 7.23 –0.3342 7.38 –0.4143 11.37 
Owned on a mortgage$ –0.1396 3.94 –0.1180 3.36 –0.2245 8.10 
Owned outright$ –0.3416 9.90 –0.2995 8.84 –0.3473 12.69 
ρ2 – – – – 0.2042 30.12 
χ2(43:44:44) [p value] 6279.8 [p=0.00] 3211.0 [p=0.00] 4987.2 [p=0.00] 
 
Specification B: 
TYPES OF CREDIT M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Log loan repayments 0.0251 8.18 0.0231 7.11 0.0210 8.16 
Log HP repayments 0.0012 0.23 0.0066 1.13 0.0102 2.16 
Log credit club repayments 0.0480 7.75 0.0511 6.21 0.0501 8.61 
ρ2 – – – – 0.2036 30.03 
χ2(45:46:46) [p value] 6311.3 [p=0.00] 3233.0 [p=0.00] 5013.4 [p=0.00] 
Censored observations 20,578 26,589 48,987 
Observations 45,349 45,349 80,573 
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Notes to Table 3: 
1. Coefficients reported are marginal effects (M.E.) on the gambling stakes of the household 
(Panel 1), head of household (Panel 2) or adult individuals within the household (Panel 3). 
For dummy variables, denoted $, the coefficient reported is for the discrete change of the 
dummy from 0 to 1. The ‘z-ratio’ reports the test that the underlying coefficient is equal to 
zero. 
2. In the household level equation (Panel 1), the individual characteristics are those of the head 
of household. Reference categories are: female; head of household white; employee; no 
disability; at least one adult in work; married; local authority or housing association. 
3. In Panel 3, ρ2 is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by the intra-household 
variation in gambling stakes. 
4. The χ2 test is a test for the joint significance of the explanatory variables. 
5. The regression in Specification B which differentiates between different types of credit also 
includes all of the other independent variables reported in Specification A. Their coefficient 
estimates are little different from those in Specification A, and so are not reported here but 
are available on request. 
6. All regressions also include 6 calendar year dummy variables and 12 regional dummy 
variables. 
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Table 4: Probit analysis of the probability of gambling by household 
income 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 
 
Panel 1: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
 M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0510 9.21 0.0418 3.27 0.0487 4.74 
Log individual current income – – – – – – 
Log household current income –0.0012 0.48 0.0094 2.58 –0.1127 7.06 
χ2(43) [p value] 5236.1 [p=0.00] 983.3 [p=0.00] 1516.9 [p=0.00] 
Observations 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
 
Panel 2: HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0441 7.93 0.0520 4.02 0.0422 4.29 
Log individual current income 0.0002 0.10 0.0007 0.19 –0.0016 0.20 
Log household current income –0.0031 0.90 0.0085 1.76 –0.0892 4.97 
χ2(44) [p value] 2886.2 [p=0.00] 677.7 [p=0.00] 876.8 [p=0.00] 
Observations 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
 
Panel 3: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0521 10.65 0.0580 4.24 0.0503 6.56 
Log individual current income 0.0065 5.45 0.0044 1.75 0.0054 2.09 
Log household current income –0.0168 6.60 0.0058 1.37 –0.1277 10.35 
ρ1 0.2441 29.73 0.3011 11.13 0.2174 16.20 
χ2(44) [p value] 4174.1 [p=0.00] 654.1 [p=0.00] 1405.0 [p=0.00] 
Observations 80,573 14,670 24,994 
Households 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
1. Coefficients reported are marginal effects (M.E.) on the probability that the household (Panel 
1), head of household (Panel 2) or adult individuals within the household (Panel 3) engages 
in any form of gambling activity. For dummy variables, denoted $, the coefficient reported is 
for the discrete change of the dummy from 0 to 1. The ‘z-ratio’ reports the test that the 
underlying coefficient is equal to zero. 
2. In the household level equation (Panel 1), the individual characteristics are those of the head 
of household. Reference categories are: female; head of household white; employee; no 
disability; at least one adult in work; married; local authority or housing association. 
3. In Panel 3, ρ1 is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by the intra-household 
variation in gambling propensity. 
4. The χ2 test is a test for the joint significance of the explanatory variables. 
5. All regressions also include the control variable reported in Table 2, plus 6 calendar year 
dummy variables and 12 regional dummy variables. 
6. Low/High income households are those that have a household income in the bottom/top 
quartile of the distribution of real household (equivalised) incomes. 
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Table 5: Tobit analysis of gambling stakes by household income 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 
 
Panel 1: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
 M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio M.E. z-ratio 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0297 10.09 0.0284 3.92 0.0277 5.29 
Log individual current income – – – – – – 
Log household current income 0.0024 0.21 0.0384 2.42 –0.5244 7.27 
χ2(43) [p value] 6279.8 [p=0.00] 1125.9 [p=0.00] 1780.2 [p=0.00] 
Censored observations 20,578 6,074 5,001 
Observations 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
 
Panel 2: HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0257 8.42 0.0340 4.51 0.0230 4.31 
Log individual current income –0.0017 0.18 0.0004 0.02 –0.0070 0.18 
Log household current income –0.0071 0.45 0.0396 1.83 –0.4169 4.96 
χ2(44) [p value] 3211.0 [p=0.00] 752.8 [p=0.00] 939.4 [p=0.00] 
Censored observations 26,589 6,638 7,274 
Observations 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
 
Panel 3: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 All households 
Low income 
households 
High income 
households 
Whether any credit repayments$ 0.0262 11.12 0.0314 4.71 0.0253 6.66 
Log individual current income 0.0266 5.63 0.0156 1.66 0.0234 2.11 
Log household current income –0.0664 6.53 0.0211 1.33 –0.5549 10.55 
ρ2 0.2042 30.12 0.2476 11.21 0.1907 16.56 
χ2(44) [p value] 4987.2 [p=0.00] 908.0 [p=0.00] 1600.9 [p=0.00] 
Censored observations 48,987 8,758 16,441 
Observations 80,573 14,670 24,994 
Households 45,349 11,337 11,337 
 
Notes to Table 5: 
1. Coefficients reported are marginal effects (M.E.) on the gambling stakes of the household 
(Panel 1), head of household (Panel 2) or adult individuals within the household (Panel 3). 
For dummy variables, denoted $, the coefficient reported is for the discrete change of the 
dummy from 0 to 1. The ‘z-ratio’ reports the test that the underlying coefficient is equal to 
zero. 
2. In the household level equation (Panel 1), the individual characteristics are those of the head 
of household. 
3. In Panel 3, ρ2 is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by the intra-household 
variation in gambling stakes. 
4. The χ2 test is a test for the joint significance of the explanatory variables. 
5. All regressions also include the control variable reported in Table 2, plus 6 calendar year 
dummy variables and 12 regional dummy variables. 
6. Low/High income households are those that have a household income in the bottom/top 
quartile of the distribution of real household (equivalised) incomes. 
 
